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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

was "not determinative" of whether or not the section pertained to
venue.
The court noted the CWA's legislative history was unclear and not
unequivocal as to whether section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction
or venue. However, Industry petitioners did not raise this argument.
The court concluded that even if they had, it would not have found
such an argument persuasive.
The court held section 509(b) (1) determines venue, not
jurisdiction. Because venue objections could be waived and Industry
petitioners conceded proper venue was no longer an issue, the court
denied Industry petitioners' motion to dismiss.
SarahE. McCutcheon
Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 237 F.3d 681 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
the provision of the Clean Water Act that establishes the computation
of time for filing a notice of appeal determines whether the notice is
timely and not the federal rules of procedure).
Slinger Drainage ("Slinger") installed drainage tiles over a fiftyacre area that resulted in the discharge of pollutants into a wetland.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Slinger alleging a violation of section
301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for failure to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutant into a wetland. The Administrative Law
Judge found Slinger liable and imposed a civil penalty of $90,000. The
Appeals Board upheld the fine, and Slinger brought this action to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits
because Slinger failed to timely file the notice of appeal. Under the
CWA, Slinger had thirty days to file its notice of appeal beginning on
the date the Appeals Board issued its order. Slinger filed its notice a
day late under the CWA provision. Slinger argued the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 26(a) ("Rule 26(a)") governed how
courts should compute the thirty-day period, and not the CWA.
Under Rule 26(a), the day the court issued its order is not calculated
in the time period, and Slinger's appeal would have been filed on
time.
The court held Rule 26(a) did not apply when Congress has
specified a particular method of counting in the statute itself and there
is no indication of a contrary congressional intention. The court
dismissed Slinger's appeal because the CWA clearly established the
computation of time.
Spencer L. Sears
United States v. A.J.S., Inc., No. CIV.A.00-0263-C, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17388 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 2000) (denying summary judgment
motion concerning a mortgage foreclosure due to the existence of

